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Abstract 
 The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station held by Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO) had a serious nuclear accident in March of 2011. TEPCO's liability for 
the losses caused by this accident is speculated to reach several trillion yen. For this 
compensation, TEPCO is supposed to sell its assets, including those for its power business. 
Their sales are crucial for TEPCO's solvency. We estimate the fundamental values of 
TEPCO's thermal plants by modeling their plant operation patterns based on spot market 
prices and fuel costs. Then, we discuss the implication of their divestiture in the context of 
the regulatory reforms as a radical path to unbundling. 
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1. Introduction 
 The Great East Japan Earthquake and the subsequent tsunami hit and heavily 
damaged the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station held by Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO) in March of 2011. The nuclear accident immensely damaged Tohoku and 
northern Kanto areas with a huge amount of radioactive substances released into the air 
and the sea. Tens of thousands of residents were evacuated from the area within 20 km from 
the power station. The Fukushima accident was rated level 7 (the highest level) on the 
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale–as serious as the Chernobyl accident in 
1986. The Fukushima accident was reported all over the world (INPO (2011), ONR (2011)) 
and invoked debates on the pessimistic future of nuclear power (Joskow and Parsons 
(2012)). 
 The loss accruing from the accident is speculated to reach several trillion yen. The 
TEPCO Management and Finance Investigation Committee (TMFIC) (2011), established by 
the Government of Japan (GOJ) to restructure TEPCO, reports that decommissioning costs 
for the four most aged reactors among the six on the site and compensation payments for the 
accident would amount to 1.2 and 4.5 trillion yen, respectively (Table 1.1). This estimate 
indicates very minimum decommissioning costs including only cold shutdown, removal of 
nuclear fuels from the spent fuel pools, disposal of radioactive substances, and reactor 
facilities demolition, but excluding final radioactive disposal costs. Furthermore, 
decontamination costs vary depending on the target air dose rate, which is supposed to be 
set from a scientific viewpoint but is sometimes affected by a groundless fear of exposure to 
radioactive substances. 
 
  
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 12-02
Hosoe, N. & Tanaka, M. 
How Much is TEPCO Worth?  Page 3 
Table 1.1: Estimated Nuclear Disaster Damage Costs for 2012–2013 
  [Unit: billion yen] 
Reactor decommissioning costs 1,151
Damage compensation costs 4,540
Compensation in the first year  1,025
Compensation in the second year  897
Compensation for temporary damages 2,618
Total 5,691
Source: TMFIC (2011) 
 
 The committee calculates the compensation costs for both persistent damages and 
temporary damages. In the former estimate, they assume 160,000 evacuees over a two-year 
period and reparation for their lost income, business damages, mental suffering, evacuation, 
and homecoming expenses. The temporary damages include the effect of harmful rumors on 
the agricultural, fishery, food, and tourism industries and depreciated property values due 
to exposure to radioactive substances. These factors are also minimal. 
 As TEPCO is supposed to compensate for this loss with support by the GOJ, 
TEPCO needs to sell its own assets–not only for its side-businesses but also its electric 
power business–to cover those expenses. Although it is planning to raise its power charges, 
such an option cannot be found acceptable by the GOJ and will result in a tariff raise that 
cannot fully cover the costs to manage its crisis. In addition, to show its unresisting and 
sincere attitude as a public utility and the wrongdoer to the GOJ, TEPCO must restructure 
its business and assets. 
 Therefore, TEPCO's solvency and the liquidity of its assets are the crucial issues. A 
large part of its liquid assets, especially its share of other companies not related to its power 
business, have been already sold. Some of the other fixed assets, such as assets of its 
affiliated companies and shares of gas companies, have been also sold. Those sales, however, 
would not be large enough to fully cover the costs related to the accident. It has to sell its 
core power business assets (Table 1.2). 
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Table 1.2: TEPCO’s Assets at the End of March, 2010 
 [Unit: billion yen] 
Fixed assets 11,855   
Electric power business facility 7,872 (100.0%)
Hydro power plants 716 (9.1%)
Thermal power plants 1,032 (13.1%)
Nuclear power plants 671 (8.5%)
Other power plants 11 (0.1%)
Transmission facility 2,178 (27.7%)
Transformation facility 866 (11.0%)
Distribution facility 2,232 (28.3%)
Other facility 166 (2.1%)
Construction in progress 651  
Nuclear fuel 904  
Other fixed assets 2,429   
Liquid assets 788   
Total 12,643  
Source: TEPCO (2011) 
 
 TEPCO’s balance sheets show that electric power business facilities account for 
about two-thirds of its fixed assets. Among these facilities, network facilities are too large to 
be taken over by other private companies. Nuclear power plants are no doubt difficult to sell 
under the current circumstances. It will have to sell its thermal plants to raise money for its 
reparation. Although their book value in the balance sheet implies the thermal plants would 
be worth about one trillion yen, more accurate estimates are needed. 
The reforms of outdated regulatory measures in Japan's power industry have often 
been discussed by, for example, METI (2006, 2011) and Nagayama (2011). In the context of 
regulatory reform, the sale of power plants has another implication–achieving de facto 
unbundling of TEPCO. Several companies will purchase the thermal power plants and 
operate as independent power producers (IPPs). Once TEPCO is divested of a large part of 
its generation capacity, it cannot be a (fully) vertically-integrated power company any longer. 
This leads to unbundling of the power system in a way different from how other countries 
have succeeded in unbundling. 
In this study, we estimate the fundamental values of TEPCO’s existing plants, 
which determine its solvency as well as the tax burden needed to make up the losses which 
TEPCO alone cannot compensate for. In Section 2, assuming load factor and profit margins 
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to be exogenous, we illustrate the fundamental value of a hypothetical plant with variations 
of these two factors as well as a discount rate. Load factor and profit margins are affected by 
the market price and the fuel costs. While the former is common for all the plants, the latter 
is plant-specific. Therefore, the profit margins can vary widely among the plants. In Section 
3, we model load factor and profit margins as endogenous variables determined by the gap 
between the spot market prices and the fuel costs. With the profit margin estimates, we 
estimate the fundamental values of the TEPCO's individual plants more accurately. In 
Section 4, we discuss the implications of the divestiture of TEPCO's thermal plants as a 
radical path toward power market reform to unbundling and wrap up our results. 
 
2. Estimating the Fundamental Values of Thermal Plants 
 with an Exogenous Load Factor Approach 
 The value of thermal plants depends on fuel type, capacity, fuel costs, sales price of 
power, load factor, project duration, discount rates, and so on. Among them, fuel costs and 
sales price of power depend on many parameters difficult to forecast for the long run. The 
fundamental value of a plant V  can be computed by considering its capacity K  (MW) and 
load factor L  yielding the profit margin   (yen/kWh) as well as the discount rate   for 
the project duration D  (years) in the following standard formula of the discounted cash 
flow (Luenberger (1997)): 
 
 
 
 

11
1124365
D
LKV  
 When we apply this formula for a hypothetical 100 MW plant earning a 1.00 
yen/kWh profit margin, we obtain the estimates shown in Table 2.1. (When either the profit 
margin per kWh, the plant capacity, or the load factor is doubled, so is the estimated 
fundamental value.) This implies that a, for example, 400-MW thermal plant with a load 
factor of 50% operating for 20 years earns 24 billion yen with the discount rate of 4% 
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assuming a profit margin of 1.00 yen/kWh. We ignore its scrap value for simplicity. The 
fundamental value less opportunity costs for alternative projects is the net revenue from 
this investment project. If the rate of return of alternative projects is assumed to be, say, 
10% or 20%, investors are willing to pay 22 or 20 billion yen for purchasing the 400-MW 
thermal plant. 
 
Table 2.1: The Fundamental Value of a 100-MW Thermal Plant Yielding a Profit Margin of 
1.00 yen/kWh 
 [unit: billion yen] 
Project duration 20 years  10 years 
 Discount rate 
Load factor 3% 4% 5% 6%  3% 4% 5% 6% 
20% 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.1  1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 
30% 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.1  2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 
40% 5.3 4.9 4.5 4.1  3.1 2.9 2.8 2.7 
50% 6.7 6.1 5.6 5.2  3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 
60% 8.0 7.3 6.7 6.2  4.6 4.4 4.2 4.0 
70% 9.3 8.6 7.9 7.3  5.4 5.1 4.9 4.7 
80% 10.7 9.8 9.0 8.3  6.1 5.9 5.6 5.4 
Note: No scrap value is assumed. 
 
 While parameters such as plant capacity, project duration, and discount rates are 
often observable or accurately estimated, the other two parameters of load factor and profit 
margins are not. Wild assumptions about these two key parameters can result in inaccurate 
estimates. Next, we estimate these two parameters by modeling the plant operation 
patterns and the half-hourly profit margin, which are endogenously determined by the fuel 
costs and the wholesale power market prices. 
 
3. Estimating the Fundamental Values of Thermal Plants 
 with an Endogenous Load Factor Approach 
 Power plants operate only when it is profitable to–the power market price is higher 
than their marginal costs, mostly fuel costs (Figure 3.1). These operation patterns determine 
load factor and profit margins, which were assumed to be exogenous in the previous section. 
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Table 3.2: The Fundamental Values of TEPCO’s Plants with the JEPX Spot Price for 2010 
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Coal Hirono+ 5 600 2004 32 2.94 26 100.0 4.87 467 
Coal Hitachi- Naka 1 1000 2003 31 2.94 43 100.0 4.87 766 
Oil Kashima 5 1000 1974 2 9.92 3 11.0 2.79 5 
Oil  6 1000 1975 3 9.92 3 11.0 2.79 8 
Oil Oi 3 350 1973 1 10.64 1 7.2 3.41 1 
Oil Hirono 3 1000 1989 17 10.07 3 9.5 3.08 32 
Oil  4 1000 1989 17 10.07 3 9.5 3.08 32 
LNG* Chiba 1 1440 2000 28 6.69 18 59.9 2.39 307 
LNG*  2 1440 2000 28 6.69 18 59.9 2.39 307 
LNG* Shinagawa 1 1140 2003 31 5.95 19 79.4 2.44 347 
LNG* Yokohama 7 1400 1998 26 6.99 15 55.4 2.27 252 
LNG*  8 1400 1998 26 6.99 15 55.4 2.27 252 
LNG Anegasaki 5 600 1977 5 9.24 2 18.3 2.23 10 
LNG  6 600 1979 7 9.24 2 18.3 2.23 13 
LNG Minami- Yokohama 3 450 1973 1 8.72 2 27.7 1.89 2 
LNG Sodegaura 1 600 1974 2 8.36 3 34.3 1.85 7 
LNG  2 1000 1975 3 8.36 6 34.3 1.85 16 
LNG  3 1000 1977 5 8.36 6 34.3 1.85 26 
LNG  4 1000 1979 7 8.36 6 34.3 1.85 35 
LNG* Futtsu 1 1000 1986 14 7.44 9 48.6 2.10 98 
LNG*  2 1000 1988 16 7.44 9 48.6 2.10 107 
LNG*  3 1520 2001 29 7.44 14 48.6 2.10 236 
LNG*  4 1520 2010 38 7.44 14 48.6 2.10 268 
LNG Higashi- 1 1000 1987 15 8.26 6 36.1 1.86 67 
LNG Ogishima 2 1000 1991 19 8.26 6 36.1 1.86 79 
LNG* Kawasaki 1 1500 2008 36 8.59 7 30.9 1.82 142 
Total                   3,882 
Note: * indicates gas-turbine combined cycle. Discount rate=4%, Year of divestiture=2012, 
Plant life=40 years. The other 28 valueless plants are omitted in this table. 
Source: Hosoe (2012) for the fuel costs, ANRE for the plant specifications. 
 
 We compute the fundamental values of all 54 of TEPCO’s thermal plants (Table 
3.2). As many plants are almost 40 years old or older, our estimates suggest that only 
several plants are worth purchasing, such as the two coal-fired thermal plants and the ten 
gas-turbine combined cycle ones. Plants installed in the mid-1970s have only marginal value. 
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Given the spot market price observed in 2010, the average profit margin, computed only for 
operating times, is about 5 yen/kWh for the coal-fired thermal plants, a little lower than 2 
yen/kWh for the LNG-fired ones, a little higher than 2 yen/kWh for the gas-turbine 
combined cycle ones, and about 3 yen/kWh for the oil-fired ones. The total of their 
fundamental values would reach 3.9 trillion yen. 
 If their scrap values, which are ignored in our estimates, are positive, these plant 
values would be larger by that much. For example, the total book value of the 15 power 
station sites for those thermal plants amounts to 0.2 trillion yen (TEPCO (2011)); the 
overage plants, which are assumed to be useless, may yield some profits. In addition to these 
currently operating plants, there are several plants scheduled to be in operation in the near 
future.2 Other than those plants that are TEPCO’s own, it has a share of joint-venture (JV) 
IPPs, such as Kimitsu JV (1,000MW), Kashima JV (1,400MW), Soma JV (1,000MW), and 
Joban JV (1,625MW). Their market values can be estimated in the same manner, though 
fuel efficiency data are not available for new plants. 
 We do not consider any shutdown time for plant maintenance in our estimates. 
While plants showing low load factor (due to high-fuel costs) can be maintained during 
off-peak seasons (i.e., spring and fall in Japan), we must explicitly assume unavailability for 
the base-load plants showing high load factor. For example, the two coal-fired plants are 
estimated to fully operate throughout the year (i.e., load factor=100%) (Table 3.2). If we 
assume their maximum load factor to be 80% to reserve their maintenance time, their 
values should be estimated at 0.2 trillion yen less. 
 Regarding the sensitivity of our estimates, the estimated fundamental values are 
dependent more on the assumed spot market prices. When we hypothetically use the 
half-hourly spot prices and annual averages of imported fuel prices observed in 2006–2009 
but using the same plant specifications and remaining plant life, the alternative estimates 
                                                     
2 Hirono No. 6 (coal, 600MW) and Hitachi-Naka No. 2 (coal, 1,000MW) are planned to start their 
operation in 2013. Kawasaki No. 2 (LNG*, 1,920MW) is scheduled to start its operation in 2013–2017. 
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of the total plant value vary from 2.2 to 9.5 trillion yen (Table 3.3).3 Note that the variations 
of the spot market prices and fuel prices were affected by a couple of crises in those years. 
TEPCO had the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station (8,212 MW) hit by the 
Chuetsu-oki Earthquake in July of 2007 and increased its power demand to cause price 
hikes at the JEPX. The year of 2009 was the post-Lehman Shock year, when power demand 
and thus spot prices sharply fell accompanied by fuel prices, as represented by the crude oil 
price in Table 3.3. However, given the recent pessimistic circumstance for the existing and 
new nuclear power plants in Japan (Joskow and Parsons (2012)), power shortages could 
persist for years. Actually, the simple average spot price, which was 8.4 yen/kWh in June 1, 
2010–February 28, 2011, sharply rose to 14.2 yen/kWh in June 1, 2011–February 29, 2012.4 
The power price hike would make the thermal plants more attractive for investors despite 
the recent energy price rises. 
 
Table 3.3: Estimated Plant Value with Alternative Market Environments 
Price data observed 
in 
Assumed data profile Estimated total 
plant value 
[bil. yen] 
Average spot price 
[yen/kWh]a 
Crude oil price 
[mil. yen/kl]b 
2006 9.32 46.8 9,469
2007 9.75 51.2 9,180
2008 11.59 67.3 7,403
2009 6.52 35.5 2,245
2010 7.81 43.8 3,882
Source: a/ simple annual average of the half-hourly JEPX spot price, b/ computed with data 
from trade statistics by Japan Customs. 
 
4. Policy Implications for Power Market Reform in Japan 
Japan’s power market reform has been implemented by introducing a market 
mechanism step–by-step since 1995. Its scope has expanded from the wholesale market to 
                                                     
3 Detailed estimates for individual plants for 2006–2009 are shown in the Appendix. 
4 Because the earthquake and the resulting power shortage forced TEPCO to suspend dispatching 
power for the third-party power companies, no trade was made for Tokyo area at the JEPX from March 
14 to May 30 in 2011. Thus, we use the June-February data for a fair comparison, here. 
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the retail market and from the market segment for large-scale users to that for smaller scale 
ones. The regulatory authority has struggled to facilitate this type of nationwide competition 
through the JEPX since its establishment in 2005. 
However, vertical unbundling of generation, transmission, and distribution 
services, which is popular in many developed countries, has not been fully implemented in 
Japan due to the strong resistance from the incumbent utilities. Moreover, horizontal 
divestiture of generation capacity has not been conducted either. Since 1951, the same 
vertically-integrated regional utilities have long been the dominant players in their 
jurisdictions and have allowed new entrants to gain only a marginal market share–as small 
as two percent in the retail market–which evidences the unsuccessful reform in the last two 
decades. 
 We estimate the fundamental values of TEPCO’s thermal plants. Their total values 
would be 2.2–9.5 trillion yen, which is comparable to TEPCO’s speculated liability for its 
reparation. The sale of thermal power plants would not only enhance TEPCO’s solvency 
after the nuclear accident but also potentially promote competition in the power market 
through de facto unbundling of TEPCO. 
 The poor achievements of those reforms can be attributed partly to the nation-wide 
transmission network designed for the regional monopoly. Many inter-regional links have 
small capacity, especially at the links connecting the two different frequency areas, and 
these are often congested by the incumbents’ transmission or reserved for specious 
"emergency" purposes to regionally segment the power market. This exacerbates the abuse 
of market power by the dominant incumbents within each jurisdiction. Although investment 
in these bottlenecks has often been proposed to resolve this abuse, the costs are too huge to 
carry out without serious commitment by the incumbents, who are naturally very reluctant 
to do so. Instead of such an expensive investment, vertical divestiture of TEPCO's 
generation capacity, even for reparation purposes, would significantly enhance competition 
across the bottlenecks in such a manner as Tanaka (2009) argues. 
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 The existing IPPs and entrants originally involved in gas, telecommunication, and 
oil refining are projected to take over TEPCO’s thermal power plants. The horizontal 
divestiture would lead to de facto vertical unbundling of TEPCO in due course. The nuclear 
disaster could open a radical path to establishing a more competitive market in Japan 
through the divestiture of TEPCO’s assets for its reparation, which is unique compared with 
the market-oriented path invented by the reform leaders in Europe and the US. 
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Appendix: Estimates of Individual Plant Values with Alternative Market Environments 
 
Note: Capacity and remaining plant lives are common. 
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Hirono+ 5 2.30 37 100.0 7.02 673 2.60 38 100.0 7.15 685 4.04 40 100.0 7.55 726 3.17 18 99.9 3.36 322
Hitachi-
Naka 1 2.30 61 100.0 7.02 1,104 2.60 63 100.0 7.15 1,124 4.04 66 100.0 7.55 1,190 3.17 29 99.9 3.36 528
Kashima 5 10.15 10 35.9 3.04 19 11.36 8 25.1 3.79 16 15.54 3 13.3 2.45 6 8.26 1 9.9 0.80 1
6 10.15 10 35.9 3.04 28 11.36 8 25.1 3.79 24 15.54 3 13.3 2.45 8 8.26 1 9.9 0.80 2
Oi 3 11.35 2 25.4 2.85 2 12.44 2 21.1 3.34 2 16.33 1 9.2 2.58 1 8.62 0 6.2 0.81 0
Hirono 3 10.29 9 34.5 3.04 115 11.52 8 24.4 3.75 100 15.78 3 12.1 2.44 32 8.39 1 8.2 0.81 7
4 10.29 9 34.5 3.04 115 11.52 8 24.4 3.75 100 15.78 3 12.1 2.44 32 8.39 1 8.2 0.81 7
Chiba 1 5.77 45 88.0 4.10 774 6.34 44 79.1 4.42 751 9.06 36 71.0 4.05 618 5.91 11 62.4 1.37 183
2 5.77 45 88.0 4.10 774 6.34 44 79.1 4.42 751 9.06 36 71.0 4.05 618 5.91 11 62.4 1.37 183
Shinagawa 1 5.13 42 97.6 4.30 752 5.64 41 99.5 4.14 738 8.05 37 81.8 4.46 655 5.25 13 82.0 1.61 237
Yokohama 7 6.04 41 80.6 4.18 676 6.64 40 74.2 4.40 655 9.47 32 68.8 3.75 519 6.17 9 53.7 1.30 140
8 6.04 41 80.6 4.18 676 6.64 40 74.2 4.40 655 9.47 32 68.8 3.75 519 6.17 9 53.7 1.30 140
Anegasaki 5 8.46 10 52.6 3.46 44 9.29 9 45.1 3.66 40 12.75 5 32.6 2.98 24 7.90 1 15.7 0.79 3
6 8.46 10 52.6 3.46 59 9.29 9 45.1 3.66 54 12.75 5 32.6 2.98 32 7.90 1 15.7 0.79 4
Minami-
Yokohama 3 7.52 9 60.3 3.90 9 8.26 9 58.5 3.75 9 11.81 5 39.8 3.29 5 7.70 1 20.1 0.79 1
Sodegaura 1 7.21 13 62.8 4.05 26 7.92 13 61.4 3.90 25 11.33 8 45.6 3.32 16 7.38 1 26.9 0.87 2
2 7.21 22 62.8 4.05 64 7.92 21 61.4 3.90 60 11.33 13 45.6 3.32 38 7.38 2 26.9 0.87 6
3 7.21 22 62.8 4.05 103 7.92 21 61.4 3.90 97 11.33 13 45.6 3.32 61 7.38 2 26.9 0.87 9
4 7.21 22 62.8 4.05 139 7.92 21 61.4 3.90 130 11.33 13 45.6 3.32 83 7.38 2 26.9 0.87 13
Futtsu 1 6.41 27 72.7 4.24 294 7.05 26 69.8 4.25 283 10.07 19 61.4 3.57 209 6.57 4 41.3 1.23 49
2 6.41 27 72.7 4.24 324 7.05 26 69.8 4.25 311 10.07 19 61.4 3.57 231 6.57 4 41.3 1.23 54
3 6.41 41 72.7 4.24 712 7.05 39 69.8 4.25 685 10.07 29 61.4 3.57 507 6.57 7 41.3 1.23 118
4 6.41 41 72.7 4.24 809 7.05 39 69.8 4.25 778 10.07 29 61.4 3.57 576 6.57 7 41.3 1.23 134
Higashi-
Ogishima 1 7.12 23 63.9 4.07 261 7.83 21 61.8 3.97 246 11.19 14 47.2 3.34 159 7.29 2 27.9 0.93 26
2 7.12 23 63.9 4.07 307 7.83 21 61.8 3.97 290 11.19 14 47.2 3.34 187 7.29 2 27.9 0.93 31
Kawasaki 1 7.41 32 61.1 3.96 612 8.14 30 59.2 3.82 572 11.64 18 41.6 3.31 350 7.59 2 23.5 0.78 46
Total 9,469 9,180 7,403 2,245
2006 2007 2008 2009
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